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Abstract 
We use a simple nonlinear commodity market model to illustrate the impact of recent reforms of 
the CAP on the variability of EU and world wheat prices. Second, within an expected utility 
framework we estimate the transfer and risk effects on producer welfare due to market liberalizing 
reforms. We found that wheat producers were over-compensated for the losses due to lower prices 
following the 1992 reforms. The transfer effect clearly dominated while the risk component was 
small. Further, we did not find producer incomes to be more unstable following to the 1992 CAP 
reforms. 
Keywords: price transmission, CAP reform, price instability, producer welfare, wheat market. 
1. Introduction 
Commodity price instability remains an important concern in many agricultural markets. The 
movement toward less government intervention in commodity markets impacts the stability of 
prices and producer welfare. In a post-Uruguay Round world, domestic price volatility will likely 
increase in those markets previously insulated from world markets. On the other hand, as more and 
more countries open their markets and participate in the international price adjustment process, less 
price volatility in world markets will occur. As a result, prices in domestic markets will become 
less stable while world market prices will become more stable. We test this hypothesis using 
domestic and border prices of wheat in the European Union (EU) and information on the nature of 
the reforms to the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP). These data are used to investigate the extent 
to which the comovement of prices between world and domestic wheat markets impacts price 
instability. We measure this price-comovement as the price transmission elasticity. Tyers and 
Anderson (1992) refer to these elasticities as "price policy parameters" while Dutton and Grennes 
(1988) describe them as a summary measure of all government policies that separate foreign and 
domestic markets. Although the commodity trade literature emphasizes the importance of these 
elasticities, little attention has focused on their specific relationship to price volatility and producer 
welfare (Bredahl et al., 1979; Zwart and Meilke, 1979; Tyers and Anderson, 1992; Mundlak and 
Larson, 1992). 
How policy reforms impact domestic and international price stability is a particularly timely topic. 
While policy makers seek answers to the impact of their decisions, others search for appropriate 
responses. For instance, as the EU transitions from a "price stabilization" policy to an "income 
maintenance" policy, what role have income transfers played in stabilizing producer incomes? By 
examining the impact of CAP policy change on price stability and producer welfare we hope to 
contribute to a better understanding of many important and complex issues. 
The purpose of this paper is twofold: first, we use a simple nonlinear commodity market model to 
illustrate the impact of recent reforms of the CAP on the variability of EU and world wheat prices; 
second, within an expected utility framework we estimate the transfer and risk effects on producers 
of trade liberalizing reforms.  
2. Analytical Framework 
Our theoretical framework is composed of two connected components. First, we specify and 
estimate a structural econometric model of the EU-rest of world (ROW) wheat market. The model 
is used to quantify important domestic and world market relationships and to show the impact of 
EU policy change on price variability. Second, we adopt an expected utility approach to evaluate 
the welfare effects of policy regime change. As EU agricultural policy transitions toward a goal of 
"income maintenance", it is sensible to use a framework that can articulate the welfare effects of a 
policy-induced change on income volatility. Our approach explicitly recognizes that the welfare   2 
impact of a policy regime change is a function of both the level and stability of producer incomes; 
thus, enabling the identification of the transfer and risk welfare effects of the policy change. 
2.1 Wheat Market Model 
Assuming nonlinear relationships, perfect substitutes and constant elasticities, we define the one-
commodity, two-region (EU and ROW) model: 
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where 
D Q  is quantity demanded (EU); A is area harvested (EU); Y is yield per unit of area (EU); 
D X  is import quantity demanded (ROW); 
S X  is export quantity supplied (EU); 
d P  is domestic 
price (EU); 
w P  is world price (EU border price); 
S
t Q 1 −  is quantity supplied in previous year (EU); T 
is linear trend; DV is a dummy variable representing a major policy change, the exponent 
parameters are the constant elasticities, the K's are constant terms, and the  i u  are independent (each 
over time) lognormally distributed disturbance variables, i.e. 
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Current time period subscripts are omitted to aid readability (with the exception of lagged 
variables). 
In this simultaneous system there are six current endogeneous variables 
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t , ( 1 −  and DV). Each equation in this system is 
identified, thus, enabling statistical estimation of the structure using standard econometric 
estimation procedures. The quantity supplied in the previous year is specified as a regressor in the 
area harvested equation since farmers, in making acreage allocation decisions, consider the 
previous year's acreage harvested as well as yield. For instance, the yield of wheat relative to 
substitutes in production, say barley, can impact area allocated to wheat. Also, since the export 
supply equation indirectly includes domestic supply, 
S
t Q 1 −  is also specified as an argument in 
equation (5); however, linear trend was not included due to its collinearity with 
S
t Q 1 − . Our 
behavioral approximation of the export supply identity ensures an overall loglinear structure. Wheat 
yields are strongly trending due to the development of higher-yielding varieties and other 
technological advances; hence the inclusion of time trend in equation (3). Finally, the price 
transmission equation also includes deterministic trend plus a dummy binary variable to account for 
the implementation of the "new CAP" in July 1993.   3 
It is important to note that we have not attempted to model EU stockholding behavior. Public 
intervention stocks are not determined as an outcome of an optimization process; rather they are 
determined as a byproduct of the price policy. With domestic prices declining over much of the 
sample period, there is no incentive for private (individual or firm) stockholding. That is, the 
intertemporal arbitrage condition dictates that the expected price next period will most certainly be 
less than the cost of storage. The stocks that do exist are simply pipeline or working stocks. EU and 
rest of world supplies, however, are adjusted for carry-in and carry-out stock levels. 
Considering the market equilibrium condition (equation 7) we no longer need to distinguish 
D X  
and 
S X  and can write the model in a linear form of the logarithms: 
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with independent (each over time) normally distributed disturbance variables, i.e. 
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First, from (11) and (13) we get 
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The equations (12) and (14) yield the instantaneous relation 
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For these expressions, variances can be calculated from the 3SLS estimation of the simultaneous 
model, 
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where, for instance,  T , 4 σ  denotes the covariance of  4 lnu  and  T ln , and 
DV QS
t , 1 − σ  represents the 
covariance of 
S
t Q 1 ln −  and DV. Expressions (18) and (19) show explicitly the dependence of the 
variance of domestic and world prices on the model parameters and on the variances and 
covariances of the variables; all of which can be estimated. Note that the dependence of the price 
transmission elasticity, 
P η , is non-linear.  





















Inequalities (20) and (21) summarize the conventional wisdom of market liberalizing policies, 
namely, as protectionist policies are removed and price transmission increases, domestic price 
variability increases while world price variability decreases. Before we discuss our model estimates 
and empirical illustrations, we provide a framework to evaluate the producer welfare impacts of a 
policy change. 
2.2 Welfare-Economic Approach 
Reforms to the CAP have resulted in significant price support reductions with the objective of 
bringing EU support prices closer to world market levels and better mirror world supply and 
demand conditions. As this evolves, a departure is made from a pricing structure that is relatively 
stable to one which can be expected to exhibit greater volatility. With price levels decreasing and 
volatility presumably increasing, producers can anticipate negative welfare impacts. Newbery and 
Stiglitz (1981) provide a methodology for the joint economic evaluation of income levels and 
stability. They characterize a risk-averse producer as having a von Neumann-Morgenstern utility 
function with income as an argument. Total welfare change is defined as the sum of the transfer and 
risk effects; the former approximates the classical Marshallian welfare measurement while the latter 
captures the change in the risk premium the agent faces in light of the policy. This framework is 
used to compute the impact of a policy which affects the riskiness of income as the change in the 
utility of income with and without the regime change. 
To show the welfare benefits of a policy change for a risk-averse farmer, consider the coefficient of 
relative risk aversion (attitude of the farmer toward risk): 
(22) ), ( ' / ) ( ' ' ) ( Y U Y U Y Y R ⋅ − =    5 
where Y denotes the farmer's income and U represents the farmer's concave utility function. To 
derive an expression for the absolute welfare benefit, B, we equate the expected utility of the 
(hypothetical) income without the CAP reform, Y*, to the expected utility of the actual income, Y, 
diminished by the value of B, 
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Expanding both sides in Taylor series, centered at the mean hypothetical income,  * Y ,and cutting 
off terms of higher than quadratic order yields 
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The first ratio of the right hand side represents a transfer portion of the relative welfare benefit and 
the rest of the right hand side a risk effect. In our empirical illustrations these dimensionless relative 
welfare benefits will be computed over a range of reasonable relative risk-aversion coefficients. 
3. Empirical Illustrations 
3.1 The Data 
Twenty-three years of annual wheat data (1976-98) were used to obtain estimates of the parameters 
of the economic model and derive our welfare estimates. Quantity data were obtained from the 
Economic Research Service and the Foreign Agricultural Service of the U.S. Department of 
Agriculture. We used trade year data which excludes intra-EU trade. Export supply is defined as the 
difference between quantity supplied (available) and quantity demanded (total domestic use) in the 
EU. Quantity supplied is annual production adjusted for imports and change in stocks. Import 
demand for the rest of the world (ROW) is defined as the difference between the quantity 
demanded and supplied in the world less the respective quantities for the EU. For both the EU and 
ROW, supply (quantity available) is stock adjusted production. Further, all data were adjusted to 
account for EU country enlargement over the sample period. World wheat prices, CIF Rotterdam 
($US), were also obtained from the USDA-ERS. For the European Union, the prices received by 
German producers serve as a proxy for EU prices. They were obtained from the CRONOS data 
bank of EUROSTAT. Currency exchange rates from the IMF were used to place world prices on a 
local (German Marks) currency basis. Both price series are annualized as geometric means of 
monthly data and are deflated by the consumer price indices of their respective countries. Before 
we discuss estimation and results, we first review the nature and evolution of the agricultural policy 
environment in the European Union.  
3.2 EU Policy Environment 
We identify two fundamentally different EU policy regime periods, the "old CAP" and the "new 
CAP".  
The CAP policy regime during the period 1976 to 1992 is characterized as the "old CAP". The 
policy objective during this period was to support farm incomes at a high and stable level. The 
general result was that EU prices were in excess of and more stable than world prices. In order to 
keep internal market prices from falling below the administratively set intervention price (set well 
above world market levels), intervention agencies would buy wheat at the intervention price, store 
it and then sell it on the world market at a loss or, more commonly, provide private exporters a 
subsidy (restitution) equal to the difference between the intervention price and the world price. At 
the same time variable levies ensured domestic market protection from low-priced imports.   6 
Responding to calls for reform, some new policies affecting cereals were implemented in 1988. At 
this time, co-responsibility levies (deductions from farmers to pay for the cost of surplus 
production), stabilizers (increase in co-responsibility and reduction in the intervention price if 
production exceeded a maximum guaranteed quantity) and, voluntary set-asides were introduced. 
The adoption of this "stabilizer package" was a somewhat successful effort to link price levels to 
output; however the "old CAP" structure of variable levies and intervention buying remained intact. 
The first major structural adjustment in European agricultural policy took place with the CAP 
(MacSharry) reform of 1992 (Mahe and Roe, 1996). The changes were considered so significant to 
warrant the name the "new CAP" (Swinbank, 1997). Although truly significant changes occurred, 
they were implemented within the existing CAP structure of variable levies, export restitutions and 
the like. This structure continued to isolate European agriculture from the world economy. 
Implemented in July 1993, the MacSharry reforms called for compensatory payments to farmers 
and a continued lowering of price supports to levels closer to expected world prices. The three 
major components of this reform were: (1) a substantial cut in intervention prices (30 percent), 
phased in over a three-year period, (2) compensation to farmers for the price cuts through subsidies 
per hectare (area premiums), and (3) land "set-aside" requirements; preference was given to small 
farmers who were eligible to receive payments without the set-aside requirement. Even though the 
compensatory payments were not truly decoupled from cropped area, this was a major step toward 
a market-oriented grain economy. It was a regime change financially as well; a move from largely 
consumer financed (through higher prices) to where taxpayers pay a larger share (compensatory 
transfers). Notwithstanding the significance of these changes, the old variable levy and export 
subsidy structure continued to insulate the EU from world markets. 
This "new CAP" period also includes the 1995 Uruguay Round Agreement on Agriculture 
(URAA). The old system of threshold prices and variable levies was abolished under the process of 
tariffication; these and other non-tariff barriers were converted to conventional tariffs and reduced 
over time. The first of the tariff cuts took place in July, 1995, and the new arrangements limited the 
import tax so that the landed price could not exceed 155 percent of the intervention price or the 
tariff equivalent, which ever was less. The tariff equivalent was to be reduced 36 percent over a six-
year period. Constraints on the total level of support provided by the CAP were also imposed. It is 
most important to note that, unlike variable levies, with fixed import levies the landed price will 
rise and fall reflecting movements in the world price. This is indeed structural reform pointing 
toward more efficient markets. However, with the "intervention price plus 55 percent" rule, a 
variable levy type system de facto remains at "high" reference (world price at Rotterdam) prices. 
Only at "low" reference prices do the fixed tariff equivalent rates apply, and yield a landed price 
that varies directly with the world price. Continued lowering of the intervention price will result in 
a broader range over which domestic prices will reflect world market conditions. Until that time, 
however, the degree of international price transmission will remain considerably less than 1.0. The 
change to tariff equivalents and limits on the volume of subsidized exports and expenditure levels 
on export subsidies (21 percent reduction on subsidized exports and budget expenditure by 36 
percent) became effective on July 1, 1995. 
3.3 Model Estimation 
Equations (8 - 13) were estimated as a system using three-stage least squares (3SLS) to obtain 
consistent parameter estimates in the presence of right-hand-side endogenous variables as well as 
contemporaneous correlation among the disturbances. Hence, there is both an economic and 
statistical dependency among the equations in our model. The parameter estimates are provided in 
Table 1. 
[Table 1 here] 
The elasticity estimates are reasonable: domestic supply is 0.29; domestic demand is -0.32; import 
supply is 0.39; export demand is -0.96, and the price transmission elasticity is 0.13. The wheat   7 
supply elasticitiy is comparable to those of Sarris and Freebairn (0.35) and Makki, Tweeten and 
Miranda (0.30). Our price elasticity of domestic demand compares to Sarris and Freebairn (-0.20), 
Tyers and Anderson (-0.30). Our price transmission elasticity is small, yet it is significantly greater 
than zero.
1 This estimate compares to those obtained by Thompson and Bohl (1999) which range 
from 0.18 to 0.25.
2 The sign and significance of the binary dummy variable parameter reflects a 
significant downward shift in domestic price beginning in July 1993 when the MacSharry reforms 
were implemented.
3  
3.4 Price Transmission and Variability 
Before we empirically examine equations (18) and (19) relative to 
P η , the underlying time series of 
d P ln  and 
w P ln  should be detrended to avoid interpreting spurious variation due to sheer trend. 
We perform this detrending in a similar manner to Cuddy and Della Valle (1978), who propose the 
usage of the corrected coefficient of variation. Since the coefficient of variation for 
w P ln  does not 
vary due to 
P η , we consider the variances instead of coefficients of variation. First, from the linear 
regression 
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R R . Thus, to release the 
variance of a time series from a linear trend, it should be multiplied by one minus the adjusted 
coefficient of determination from a regression on time. We get an adjusted coefficient of 
determination of 0.972 for domestic prices and 0.841 for world prices. These detrended variances 
for domestic prices and for world prices are plotted in Figure 1 dependent on 
P η . These are the 
empirical illustrations of equations (18) and (19) and confirm the expected directional impacts of 
the inequalities (20) and (21). They are the detrended variances derived from equation (29). In 
Figure 1 it is apparent that, as 
P η  increases the variability of domestic price increases and world 
price drcreases. These are trend-adjusted variances. While these two variances converge as 
P η  
increases, it is important to recognize that little confidence can be maintained in extrapolating 
values of 
P η  that are well beyond two standard errors of our estimated transmission elasticity. 
[Figure 1 here] 
3.5 Policy Change and Producer Welfare 
In this section we explore the welfare implications of the MacSharry and URAA reforms. We 
estimate the transfer and risk effects of the "new CAP" as shown in equation (25). Measurement of 
the transfer effects is straightforward. Producer income accruing from the new policy regime is   8 
compared to that which would have been expected if the new policy had not been implemented. 
First, domestic prices, 
d P , are calculated from equation (15) using the estimated parameters from 
Table 1 and neglecting the disturbance terms. Hypothetical prices, 
* d P , which would have been 
observed over the six year post-reform period (1993 - 98), are derived similarly, but setting the 
dummy variable DV to zero. This dummy variable was introduced to our structural model to 
indicate the policy change. If we now let it be zero, we should get the prices that had occurred 
without the CAP reform in the last six years. Next, the supply quantities, 
S Q , are calculated 
endogeneously as the product of area harvested and yield per hectare, again using the estimates 
from Table 1. This results in the recursive expression, 
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CAP reform, are calculated by analogy, but utilizing the hypothetical prices and the recursively 
following hypothetical lagged supply quantities. Finally, we use these values to derive annual 
supply functions from our model, 
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and annual (hypothetical) producer losses from the CAP reform, 
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Turning back to our welfare-economic approach in section 2.2, we are comparing the expected 
utilities of a hypothetical income,  t t t Z Y Y − = , 0
* , with that of the actual income,  t t t K Y Y + = , 0 , 
where  t K  denotes the average annual (real) transfer payments that have been given to the farmers 
as a compensation for the experienced producer losses. 
Using the above procedure we simulate the transfer and risk effects of the post-1992 CAP reforms. 
For all computations we use our estimated price transmission elasticity of 0.13. Thompson and 
Bohl (1999) found little evidence to support a significant increase in the transmission between 
world and domestic prices following the reforms of the 1990s. Similarly, Thompson, Herrmann and 
Gohout (1999) found no evidence of price transmission change after the URAA decision on 
tafiffication. Notwithstanding these results, the greater the transmission of prices, the greater the 
expected welfare benefits. 
Since hectare premia payments were used to compensate farmers for reduced prices, we compute 
producer welfare effects both with and without these payments; the top and bottom portions of 
Table 2, respectively. With payments, both the transfer and risk effects are positive. The transfer 
effect is invariant to the degree of producer risk aversion while the risk effect is positively related. 
Without payments (lower portion of Table 2), the transfer effect is –0.229. That is, producers would 
have been willing to pay 23 percent of their income to avoid the implementation of the reforms. 
However, with compensation (upper portion of Table 2), there is a positive welfare gain; that is, 
producer annual income is 4.6 percent greater than without the post-1992 reforms. Clearly, 
producer losses are avoided only with direct payments.   9 
[Table 2 here] 
While the actual direct payments more than offset the estimated negative transfer effects without 
payments, they had little impact on the riskyness of producer incomes. Strategic targeting of 
payments, however, can be used as a tool to provide greater income stability. 
Our conclusion is that farmers were over-compensated for the losses due to lower prices. This 
result is valid for all years except 1993 where we found under-compensation. These findings are 
consistent with previous studies also finding farmers as a group to be over-compensated in the mid-
1990s (Buckwell). Moreover, the transfer effect clearly dominated while the risk component was 
effectively zero. Thus, the 1992 reforms did not contribute to significant income risk, as many 
market participants expected. 
4. Concluding Remarks 
This study examines the theoretical and empirical relationships among policy reform, domestic and 
international price stability and producer welfare. Using an expected utility approach we compute 
the transfer and risk effects on wheat producers in the European Union due to a major policy 
change. We illustrate the policy-induced effects by using estimates obtained from a partial 
equilibrium model of the world wheat market. Twenty-three years of data were used for model 
estimation and several important findings were obtained. 
First, as the EU continues on the path of market liberalization, albeit slowly, real domestic price 
levels can be expected to fall while price instability will increase, ceteris paribus. As the EU 
participates more fully in the world marketplace, we expect world prices will become more stable. 
Trend-adjusted price variances increase for the EU and decrease for the world. 
Second, our estimated price transmission elasticity from world to domestic EU markets is 0.13. 
Although small, we conclude this elasticity estimate is significantly greater than zero. Together 
with our estimated market model, we use this transmission elasticity to assess the welfare impacts 
of the 1992 CAP reforms. We evaluate average producer incomes with and without the policy 
reforms. Following Newbery and Stiglitz, we decompose the aggregate welfare estimate into its 
transfer and risk components. 
Third, we found average producer welfare increased as a result of the 1992 CAP reforms. With 
hectare premia payments, farmers were over-compensated 4.6 percent of average annual incomes 
as a result of the policy change. However, without direct payments farmers would have incurred 
welfare losses of some 23 percent. Producer losses were avoided only because of the direct 
payments. 
Our conclusion is that farmers were over-compensated for their losses due to lower prices. This 
finding is consistent with previous research finding farmers as a group to have been over-
compensated in the mid-1990s. Additionally, the 1992 reforms did not contribute to increased 
producer income risk, a pre-reform fear of many.   10 
 
Notes 
1. For  0 : 0 =
P H η  and  0 : >
P
a H η , the t-value of 1.68 has p-value = 0.0547, 19 d.f. 
2.  These authors used monthly data for the same prices over the same sample period used in this 
study to investigate the stochastic generating processes of the wheat price data. As a result of a 
number of integration, cointegration and price asymmetry tests, they obtained reliable long-run 
international wheat price transmission elasticities ranging from 0.18 to 0.25, with the larger 
estimate occurring during the post-MacSharry reform subperiod. 
3.  A Chow-test (Chow, 1960) for structural change was performed based on two regressions of 
d P  on 
w P  and T; the first for  ) 1992 ( 17 , , 1￿ = t  and, the second,  23 , ), 1993 ( 18 ￿ = t . The null 
hypothesis of no change was rejected with p-value less than 0.00001. 
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Tables 
Table 1.  Model Parameter Estimates, 1976 - 98 
           2 R  
eq. (8)  =
D Q ln   6.07 
(44.66) 
d P ln 32 . 0 ⋅ −  
) 00 . 14 (−  
   0.90 
eq. (9)  = A ln   19 . 1  
(2.07) 
d P ln 10 . 0 ⋅ +  
(2.70) 
S
t Q 1 ln 24 . 0 − ⋅ +  
(2.83) 
 0.28 
eq. (10)  = Y ln   29 . 14 −  
(-3.45) 
d P ln 19 . 0 ⋅ +  
(1.40) 
T ln 29 . 3 ⋅ +  
(4.38) 
 0.92 
eq. (11)  = X ln   8.10 
(5.30) 
w P ln 96 . 0 ⋅ −  
(-3.62) 
   0.31 
eq. (12)  = X ln   34 . 14 −  
(-3.36) 
d P ln 39 . 0 ⋅ +  
(1.38)  
S
t Q 1 ln 35 . 3 − ⋅ +  
(5.30) 
 0.66 
eq. (13)  =
d P ln   22.42 
(7.83) 
w P ln 13 . 0 ⋅ +  
(1.68) 
T ln 83 . 3 ⋅ −  
(-7.02) 
DV ⋅ − 24 . 0  
(-6.58) 
0.99 
Note: t-values are in parantheses. 
 
Table 2.  Welfare Effects of the 1992 CAP Reform, 1993 – 1998 (%) 
() * Y R   0.5 1.0 1.5 2.0 2.5 3.0 
results with payments: 
transfer  4.676 4.676 4.676 4.676 4.676 4.676 
risk  0.019 0.039 0.058 0.077 0.096 0.115 
* Y B   4.695 4.715 4.734 4.753 4.772 4.791 
results without payments: 
transfer  -22.937 -22.937 -22.937 -22.937 -22.937 -22.937 
risk  0.041 0.081 0.122 0.162 0.202 0.242 
* Y B   -22.896 -22.856 -22.815 -22.775 -22.735 -22.695 
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Figures 
Figure 1.  Detrended variances of domestic and world wheat prices and the elasticity of 
price transmission, . 
P η  
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